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TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS UNSEEN LAW
NATASHA AFFOLDER *
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A. INTRODUCTION: THIRTEEN WORDS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
With thirteen words in the Storrs Lecture in 1956, Philip Jessup created an incurable itch
for legal scholars. 1 This itch emerges from a conception of Transnational Law that was
at once clarifying and obscuring in its specification that “public and private international
law are included as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard
categories.” 2 With these words, Jessup expressed discontent with the inadequacy of
existing terminology and approaches to conceptualizing border-crossing law. He flagged
the profound misalignment between a solely state-mediated view of law underlying much
international legal theory and his own experience of law in the world. In so doing, he
created space to acknowledge law’s other sources, legal rules and sources of knowledge
about law that matter in practice but ill-fit standard categories. Usefully, Jessup did not
offer a restrictive list of what these misfits might be. The concept of Transnational Law
he advanced was therefore not so much a singular and fully embellished fait accompli as
it was the refreshing creation of a new intellectual holding pen for ideas about law and its
border-crossing movements.
Part of the allure of Jessup’s description of transnational law lies in its promise of
capturing something beyond the visible bodies of public and private international law –
I am grateful to the organizers and participants of “Jessup’s Bold Proposal: Engagements with
‘Transnational Law’ after Sixty Years” for stimulating these ideas and ongoing conservations. I also
thank Nicholas Healey for his excellent research assistance.
1
Philip C. Jessup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Yale University Press, 1956) [Jessup].
2
Id, at 2.
*

in its invocation to uncover unseen law, other law, law that is important in practice but
neglected in scholarship. There have been many recent attempts to frame and name this
unseen law: through raising awareness of informal international law-making, 3 in
identifying the turn to stealthier means of transnational legal ordering, 4 by revealing the
“hidden world” of WTO governance, 5 by disclosing the “hidden tools” that populate
international investment law, 6 and in unveiling the obscured interactions of private
international law on public international law. 7 Such contributions emerge in studies
variously described as international, transnational, comparative, and global. Yet they
invoke a Jessup-inspired approach to transnational law in the sense that they draw on “a
larger storehouse of rules to apply” and fail to “worry whether public or private law
applies in certain cases.” 8
Vocabularies of visibility and invisibility continue to permeate transnational law
discourse. Jessup’s project of “illuminating a transnational space” 9 addresses “the empty
space left by the existing doctrinal perspectives”. 10 Transnational law is “a lens” through
which particular relationships between national laws become visible. 11 Bringing
transnational law “into view” demands seeing transnational law as a whole, if not, “then
many of its features will be lost to sight, the programmatic development of the system
will be obscured, and the systematic absence of concern for legality and human rights
will be hidden.” 12 In such a way, transnational law, whether viewed predominantly as a
J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel & J. Wouters, INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (Oxford University
Press, 2012).
4
G. Shaffer & C. Coye, From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law, From Transnational
Law to Transnational Legal Orders, UC IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2017-02. (crossreference to Shaffer’s chapter if it is included in this volume at p. 17).
5
A. Lang & J. Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20:3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 575–614 (2009).
6
P. Fox & C. Rosenberg, The Hidden Tool in a Foreign Investor’s Toolbox: The Trade Preference
Program as a ‘Carrot and Stick’ to Secure Compliance with International Law Obligations, 34
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 53–80 (2013).
7
A. Mills, Rediscovering the Public Dimension of Private International Law, 24 HAGUE YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–23 (2011); A. Mills, Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public
International Perspective on Private International Law, in: H. Muir Watt and D. Fernández Arroyo
(eds.), PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Oxford University Press, 2014), 245–
261.
8
Jessup, supra note 1, at 15.
9
B. Bowling and J. Sheptycki, Global Policing and Transnational Rule with Law, 6:1 TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL THEORY (2015) 141-173, 146.
10
G-P. Calliess and P. Zumbansen, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE (Cambridge University
Press, 2010) at 11.
11
P. Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance and Legal
Pluralism 21 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (2012) 305, at 307.
12
Neil Boister, Further Reflections on the Concept of Transnational Criminal Law, 6:1 TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL THEORY (2015) 9-30, at 30.
3

body of substantive law or as a methodology, implicates an enlarging of law’s vision
field.
Despite the appetite for viewing border-crossing law in expansive ways, the task of
making visible the actualities of law and practice comprising transnational law involves
slippery methodological questions that legal scholars seem particularly skilled at
sidestepping. Jessup himself invoked the need to more fully capture an expansive view
of the sources of international law, and suggested some unconventional methods for
elucidating these sources. 13 Neither Jessup nor the scholars who have individually taken
up the task of revealing hidden aspects of transnational law, though, have squarely tackled
the question of how best to address not only the unseen aspects of transnational law but
also the disparity between the known and the unknowable.
This short chapter takes some first steps towards filling this gap. First, the chapter
examines the intellectual holding pen created by Jessup for other rules and sources of
law, his “larger storehouse of rules”. While this initiative was firmly aimed at expanding
the view of law to see beyond the state and to center practice in its vision field, the tools
and methods for studying and elucidating such a vision of law remain unclear. Second,
the chapter interrogates the meaning of the practice-enriched perspective that
transnational law claims to deliver, arguing that those who invoke practice in fact mean
many different things. Finally, the chapter grounds its somewhat abstract reflections on
visibility and invisibility in an examination of the difference such issues make to
transnational environmental law research. By identifying four “black boxes” that limit
access to knowledge, the challenge of discovering unseen law becomes more apparent.
Jessup himself acknowledged the partiality of the peek-a-boo views of transnational
processes that populate scholarship. 14 Emerging from an awareness that the transnational
law “lens” delivers but a selective view, and that forms and manifestations of legal
knowledge continue to elude us, are tantalizing possibilities for future research.

13
Jessup offered methodological suggestions as to how transnational law could be mapped by scholars,
drawing on “useful precedents” from maritime law including usages, codes, conferences, practices
“codified by the voluntary action of shipping interests”, inclusion of rules in bills of lading, and the
adoption of identical domestic legislation in maritime states: Jessup, supra note 1, at 109–110.
14
Jessup, for example, noted the challenges in accessing “secret archives” and the barriers on new
knowledge imposed by “unfamiliar scientific terminology” and “official security classifications.”: P.C.
Jessup & H.J. Taubenfeld, Outer Space, Antarctica, and the United Nations, 13:3 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 363–379, 363 (1959) [Jessup & Taubenfeld].

B. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS AN INTELLECTUAL HOLDING PEN:
JESSUP’S “LARGER STOREHOUSE OF RULES”
In the sixty years that have passed since the Storrs Lecture, scholars have flocked to
Jessup’s definition of transnational law as a safe haven – a place for exploring the multiple
sites and manifestations of transnational legality that comprise “all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers”. 15 Transnational Law has become a
form of intellectual shorthand, a terminology that unites scholars who share a
dissatisfaction with versions of public international law that are too limited in their vision,
too erasing of people, places, sites of law-making, and sources of knowledge about law.
Transnational Law equally provides respite from a view of private international law that
is too blind to its public facing and political dimensions. Not surprisingly, much of the
intellectual energy that has emerged in transnational law scholarship is based on critique
(both explicit and implicit) of what non-transnational law misses.
The resulting shared project of mapping and understanding the interactions between
private and public, and the intermeshing of state and non-state actors in law-making, has
worked to advance Jessup’s aspiration of engaging with actualities, and to fill the “gaps”
in knowledge that Jessup’s concept of transnational law hinted at but failed to definitively
diagnose. These compulsions are expressed not only in scholarship that self-identifies
with a transnational law label, but can be seen in recent public international law and
private international law literatures that aim to better elucidate how international law
“works in practice”. 16
Jessup’s unwillingness to define and restrict the “larger storehouse of rules” he evoked in
defining transnational law was a genius move. It effectively secured transnational law’s
enduring appeal by hinting at this term’s ongoing capacity to capture a wider vision field.
Transnational law has secured its place in legal thought by serving, given this flexibility,
as a much-needed placeholder for contemporary anxieties. It has created space for
scholars yearning to better reflect the important, diverse, and intermeshed roles of the
state and non-state in law-making, to reject compartmentalized views of public and
private international law, to take practice seriously as a source of both norms and legal

Jessup, supra note 1, at 2.
See e.g. Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights Experimentalism, 111:2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 277–316 (2017). This compulsion can also be traced through scholarship on global
legal pluralism, global administrative law, transnational legal process, transnational legal orders, transgovernmental regulatory networks, international organizations as lawmakers, and new legal realism and
international law.
15
16

knowledge, and to embrace a plurality of legal sources in capturing the “larger storehouse
of legal rules”. 17
But framing an inquiry as “transnational” does not only reveal previous blind spots. It
also provides an opportunity to reintroduce or perpetuate partial visions of law. A
transnational law framing will emphasize certain ideas, inquiries, and actors at the
expense of others. While it is easy to applaud the task of more expansively covering law
“as it is experienced in the world”, it is harder to soberly measure how well scholars are
achieving this goal. It is, however, evident that there is a scholarly appetite for seeking to
make visible obscured dimensions of law’s function and features as it crosses borders. An
example of this is a recent study of commercial lawmaking within the United Nations that
describes itself in this way:
We focus on the least visible of lawmaking institutions: international
organizations that function more like legislatures… As an empirical investigation,
this book penetrates the zones of invisibility that cloud the production of legal
norms that govern international commerce and trade. 18
Feminist scholarship provides a useful reminder to those contemplating transnational
law’s selective gaze of the potentially problematic nature of both visibility and
invisibility. Marginalized groups are often shown to occupy positions of hyper-visibility19
while the experiences of dominant communities enjoy a claim to universality as the
hegemonic norm that conceals their domination. 20 In other situations, feminists describe
invisibility as a situation of marginalization 21 from which women, and particularly certain
groups of women, are deprived of political agency. A central occupation for many
feminist scholars is identifying the unknown, and in response, making known what is
hidden by legal processes. 22 Feminist theory thus offers an ever-present reminder that
Jessup, supra note 1 at 15.
S Block-Lieb and TC Halliday, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 23 (emphasis mine).
19
S. Arat-Koç, Invisibilized, Individualized, and Culturalized: Paradoxical Invisibility and HyperVisibility of Gender in Policy Making and Policy Discourse in Neoliberal Canada, 29:3 CANADIAN
WOMAN STUDIES 6–18 (2012).
20
R. Simpson & P. Lewis, An Investigation of Silence and a Scrutiny of Transparency: Re-examining
Gender in Organization Literature through the Concepts of Voice and Visibility, 58:10 HUMAN
RELATIONS 1253–1275, 1263–1264 (2005).
21
M. Yamada, Invisibility is an Unnatural Disaster: Reflections of an Asian American Woman, in: C.
Moraga & G. Anzaldúa (eds.), THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF
COLOR (SUNY Press, 1981), 35.
22
See R. Ahlers & M, Zwarteveen, The Water Question in Feminism: Water Control and Gender
Inequities in a Neo-Liberal Era, 16:4 GENDER PLACE AND CULTURE 409–426, 414–416 (2009) (exposing
the practices of water resource management through which neo-liberal discourse renders unseen the
17
18

facts, events, vocabularies, outcomes, processes and people can all be erased by
methodological choices and starting points.
Mariana Valverde’s Chronotopes of Law identifies how a scale shift in feminist legal
thought to embrace the transnational has, perhaps unintentionally, relegated certain
feminist critiques to the background. These include feminist critiques of marriage and
unpaid housework. 23 A shift in scale to the transnational tends to focus attention on
‘flows, networks and governance assemblages’ 24 and divert attention away from the
individual people who comprise these processes. 25 This work is a powerful reminder that
a scale shift, such as that to the transnational in studying law, does not only lead to
productive new fields of vision, it also implies abandoning other sights and sites of legal
activity. Feminist critiques of “the male gaze” highlight the stakes that are implicated in
the very act of seeing. 26
C. WHAT IS A PRACTICE-ENRICHED PERSPECTIVE?
Practice is a single word that denotes many things. It is invoked so often and in so many
different ways that it is worth spending some time thinking about why and how scholars
use ‘practice’ and ‘practices’ to illuminate law and legal processes. Jessup’s own appeal
to the practical was not singular. He invokes practice in multiple ways, including 1)
through focusing on problems applicable to the ‘complex interrelated world
community’ 27 (the lived reality of law) 2) by appealing to practitioner knowledge (what
lawyers know), 3) by drawing on his own diplomatic and government experience
(personal experience of international diplomacy), 2) by clarifying that law’s problems
transcend legal sub-disciplines (highlighting the practical need for intra-disciplinary
problem-solving) 4) with alertness to the extra-legal (arguing that law includes processes
that go beyond adjudication such as business negotiations and re-negotiations), 28 5)
political nature of decision-making); F. Johns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An
Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 893–923,
917–919 (1994) (employing feminist critiques of the public/private divide and jurisdictional doctrines to
reveal how transnational corporations hide their damaging exploitation of women’s labour).
23
M. Valverde, CHRONOTOPES OF LAW: JURISDICTION, SCALE AND GOVERNANCE (Routledge, 2015), 106
[Valverde].
24
Id.
25
N Affolder, Transnational Environmental Law’s ‘Missing People’, 8 TRANSNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2019) (forthcoming).
26
Valverde, supra note 23 at 58.
27
Jessup, supra note 1 at 1.
28
Jessup, supra note 1 at 6. (“One notes that the problem of extracting and refining oil in Iran may
involve - as it has - Iranian law, English law, and public international law. Procedurally it may involve as it has - diplomatic negotiations, proceedings in the International Court of Justice and in the Security
Council, business negotiations with and among oil companies, and action in the Iranian Majlis.”)

employing an explicit attempt to align legal concepts and their definition with ‘realities’
(law in action), 29 and 6) by applauding those scholars and judges whose work has a
practical real-world impact on international politics. 30
These multiple uses of practice can all be seen in the Storrs Lecture. In that lecture, Jessup
explicitly distinguishes his own approach to law from that of Grotius who detached
himself from “every particular fact”, agreeing with a characterization of Grotius as “a
scholar, and his only authority was that of a scholar.” 31 While Jessup, like many others,
implies that “practice” gives one “authority” beyond that of a scholar, the nature of that
authority and the qualification threshold for claiming it, remain underspecified.
Beyond invoking the value of legal practice and citing diplomatic experience as
informing real world knowledge, Jessup suggests that rules emanate from “practices” as
diverse as those of General Motors, secret societies, towns, cities, states. 32 Jessup did not
himself include the word “practices” in his own definition of Transnational Law in the
Storrs Lecture. Yet subsequent scholars have made such an insertion, claiming that
“’Law’ for Jessup is composed of all rules and practices which regulate actions and
events”. 33
In the sixty years since Jessup’s Storrs’ lecture, appeals to practice in legal scholarship
appear to have multiplied. The common vocabulary of practice, and practices, circulating
through this scholarship may hide the fact that quite different things are being invoked:
‘law in action’ as opposed to ‘law on the books’, an understanding of law common to
law’s practitioners as opposed to “detached” scholars, the real world of international
politics and diplomacy, social practices of institutions and groups of non-state actors.
Indeed, as legal scholarship exhibits a growing comfort with sociolegal and ethnographic
methodologies that seek to understand law through social practices, it remains difficult to
elucidate whether the ‘practices’ being referred to are indeed seen as social practices,
legal practices, or something else entirely. Unfortunately, the language of practice seems
to be invoked somewhat more often than effort is put into articulating what is indicated
by it. And at times, invoking “practical relevance” is simply an undisguised critique of
Jessup, supra note 1 at 7. He thus approvingly quotes Justice Cardozo’s own Storrs Lecture: “Law and
obedience to law are facts confirmed every day to us all in our experience of life. If the result of a
definition is to make them seem to be illusions, so much the worse for the definition; we must enlarge it
till it is broad enough to answer to realities.”
30
Jessup, supra note 1 at 10-11, acknowledging that Grotius “and succeeding scholars have not been
without their influence on developments in international politics”.
31
Jessup, supra note 1 at 10 (quoting Max Rodin).
32
Jessup, supra note 1 at 9.
33
N. de B. Katzenbach, Transnational Law (Review) 24 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
(1957) 413-417, at 413 (emphasis mine).
29

the lack of utility of theory. Such uses accompany calls to redirect legal scholars to the
mission of serving “the profession”, invoking past glory days when law professors were:
strictly at the service of the practical profession – the judges and practicing
lawyers. Law professors aspired to Utility rather than Truth. Their demeanor and
attire were professional, worldly (as were their incomes), in comparison to the
mild bohemianism by which the true don proclaimed (and proclaims) his
independence from the quotidian. 34
Simply put, legal scholarship seems to have sidestepped the detailed methodological
debates that have marked the “practice turns” in other disciplines such as international
relations or history. 35 The consequence is that legal practice tends to be invoked as some
non-contentious and non-political body of common knowledge without being subjected
to the usual questions of legitimacy given to sources of law, and sources of knowledge
about law. Practice, in such a way, acquires an assumed, rather than an up-for-debate,
rationality. The reason that the methods for studying, or revealing, practice matter, in
particular, to a collection of essays exploring Jessup’s legacy, is that a practice-informed
perspective was so central to Jessup’s vision of transnational law. The value of studying
practices to reveal unconscious knowledges that might be taken for granted or obscured,
and unseen dynamics of socialization, 36 remain no less relevant to current transnational
law scholarship.
The fact that the meaning, and particular authority, resident in law’s practice-claims
remains little explored suggests that there is room for more explicit scholarly discussion
about how lawyers and legal scholars, and which ones, get to access and represent legal
practice in producing those more complete/accurate/true to life visions and versions of
law that “practice-informed perspectives” claim, at least implicitly, to provide. Who gets
to draw on the experience of their own lives with a sense that their experience of practice
is of more than anecdotal value? As legal scholars, do we unwittingly reproduce very
selective “practice-informed perspectives” by our unspoken assumptions as to whose
practice and whose perspective on that practice is worth capturing in text? Do we need to
adopt more deliberate, and different, methodologies to ensure that varied, diverse, and
thus widely representative “practice-informed perspectives” are shared? And what is it
RA. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today 45 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1647, at 1648 (1993).
J. Kustermans, Parsing the Practice Turn: Practice, Practical Knowledge, Practices, 44:2
MILLENNIUM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 175–196 (2016).
36
T Schatzki, Introduction: Practice Theory in T Schatzki, K Cetina, and E von Savigny, eds, THE
PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY (Routledge, 2001) 10 at 13; M Polyakov, Practice Theories:
The Latest Turn in Historiography? (2012) 6 J Phil Hist 218 at 218-219.
34
35

exactly that a practice-informed perspective is seeking to offer – a fuller, wider, or just
different, vision of law, or a more ‘true to life’ vision, and if so true to whose life?
Many of these anxieties trace to the fact that legal scholarship can be marked by
methodological timidity, and sometimes even an aversion to saying much at all about
methodological choices. Fleur Johns’ Non-Legality in International Law is a wonderful
example of a book shaped and coloured by Johns’ experience in range of practice settings,
including corporate practice in New York. By referencing her own prior experience in
legal practice as a research methodology, she uses the term ‘quasi-ethnography’, a term
coined by social scientists seeking to note the limits of their ethnographic studies. 37 By
being explicit about the practice base upon which she personally draws, Johns’ references
to practice take on greater meaning and clarity. Other scholars find ways to clarify their
conceptions of practice and practices, by defining practices by what they are not. For
example, human rights scholars differentiate practices of human rights from human rights
discourses, taking care to note that the two are mutually constitutive. 38
Ethnographic work has illuminated the difference a practice-informed perspective makes
in the sense of revealing law through its “lived practices and techniques”. 39 Such work,
for example, allows scholars to adjust where they direct their gaze in understand global
supply chains, revealing the importance of detailed scrutiny of practices that occur not
only in but around the chain. 40 Studying legal knowledge in this way can involve looking
at quite diverse sites of practice, including viewing law as the product of specialized
elites, 41 or analyzing law as the product of automation and routinized practices. 42 As
transnational sites of knowledge production increasingly attract the interest of legal
scholars, law’s visual field is adjusted by a willingness to examine how legal knowledge
is formed through material practices.

F. Johns, NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge, 2013) 22; See B. Owen, IN THE MIX:
STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL IN A WOMEN’S PRISON (SUNY Press, 1998).
38
M Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local in M. Goodale and
SE Merry eds, THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE
LOCAL (Cambridge, 2007) 1-38, at 18. This chapter title again draws on the language of visibility in its
exercise of envisioning law.
39
See SE Merry, New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law 31:4 LAW & SOCIAL
INQUIRY (2006) 975-995.
40
See B Reinke and P Zumbansen, Transnational Liability Regimes in Contract, Tort, and Comparative
Law: Comparative Observations on ‘Global Supply Chain Liability’ in S Schiller (ed.) LE DEVOIR DE LA
VIGILANCE (Lexis Nexis 2019).
41
Y. Dezalay and BG Garth, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS (University of Chicago
Press, 2002).
42
See e.g. A. Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Market (2011) 230;
Johns, supra note 37 at 64.
37

Many of the scholars writing practice-inspired accounts of international law and
transnational regulation do so after a career-long engagement with practice and draw on
their own lives in creating practice-informed perspectives. Martti Koskenniemi, for
example, has explicitly drawn attention to the importance of his long career practicing
international law with the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping the starting
points for From Apology to Utopia.43 David Kennedy, a scholar whose own writing is
animated by deep suspicions about expert rule and its tendency to marginalize
opportunities for contestation, writes in an anecdote-rich way that reveals the depth of his
expertise, his networks, and his experience in professional practice. 44
While personal experience-rich accounts such as Kennedy’s, and monumental interviewbased and practice-reflecting texts like John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos’ Global
Business Regulation, provide models of practice-informed scholarly writing, they are
exceptional examples of such work. Kennedy provides a rich view of the “field” from
social and professional interactions without the interruptions of footnotes denoting
interview numbers and ethics approvals, but, in reality, produced based on unparalleled
access to both grassroots and elite military, economic, and humanitarian actors.
Braithwaite and Drahos document a decade-long process of interviewing 500
“international leaders in business and government”. 45 They explain the purpose of
undertaking such a monumental number of interviews as revealing “what the formal
language of international intellectual property agreements does not: the informal dynamic
of power that determines the choice of words, their meaning, and subsequent
utilization.” 46
Jessup’s conception of transnational law presents us with the challenge of creating
“practice informed” perspectives of law. Such a task demands being explicit about how
we are creating these accounts. What methodological safeguards might ensure that the
visions of practice that do inform accounts of transnational law do not unwittingly
reproduce the very patterns of privilege and marginalization of sources of knowledge that

M. Koskenniemi, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), 562.
44
D. Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics of
Expertise, 5 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 463–497 (2001); D. Kennedy, A WORLD OF
STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (Princeton
University Press, 2016), p. 2; D. Kennedy, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (Princeton University Press, 2004), xvi.
45
J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
46
P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE INFORMATION ECONOMY?
(Oxford University Press, 2002), preface.
43

they seek to address? Acknowledging that there are “black boxes” of knowledge about
law, the task of the next section, might be one first step.
D. ACCESSING TRANSNATIONAL
“SECRET ARCHIVES”

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW’S

The next section of the chapter looks to some concrete challenges in realizing the Jessupinspired ideal, a version of practice-informed, problem-addressing transnational law.
Jessup did not hesitate to acknowledge the gaps in public and private international law,
nor the impediments to accessing information contained in “secret archives”. 47 He was
not explicit about what those “secret archives” were but cited scientific knowledge and
official security classifications as examples. 48 Applying the idea of “secret archives” to
the research context of the contemporary transnational environmental law scholar, I
explore below four examples of “black boxes” that limit access to knowledge. They are
far from an exhaustive list of problem areas for accessing rich and full views of
transnational legal problems. A more complete list might more comprehensively target
the geographic imbalances of the available data of “global” environmental law, the
consequences of language barriers (and English-language defaults), search engine biases
(and online-research defaults), the obscuring of environmental issues most pressing to
women, the ways in which environmental terminology is complicated by disparate
meanings, and the absence of indigenous law in accounts of global environmental law
processes.
Indeed, transnational environmental law presents a particularly rich venue for observing
such tensions up close. For scholars interested in environmental problems, accessing the
specialized knowledge of different regimes (trade, investment, intellectual property,
international criminal law) requires confronting immediate challenges. Fragmentation,
and the resulting limits of “insider knowledge”, make it harder to know what scholars fail
to see, and what sources are “hidden from view”. 49 The challenges of classifying various
aspects of “global background law” 50 or “fuzzy law” 51 that populate environmental law
practice explain the allure of Jessup’s transnational law terminology as a “catch-all”.

Jessup & Taubenfeld, supra note 14, at 363.
Id.
49
See N. Affolder, Looking for Law in Unusual Places: Cross-Border Diffusion of Environmental Norms,
7:3 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 425–449 (2018) [Affolder].
50
R. Michaels, The UNIDROIT Principles as Global Background Law, 19:4 UNIFORM LAW REVIEW
643–668 (2014).
51
O. Perez, Fuzzy Law: A Theory of Quasi-Legality, in: P. Glenn & L. Smith (eds.), LAW AND THE NEW
LOGICS (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 236.
47
48

I. The Partial Knowledge Base of Arbitration
In transnational law scholarship, international arbitration (both investment arbitration and
international commercial arbitration) has occupied a privileged place as providing
precisely that “larger storehouse of rules” that Jessup invoked. International arbitration is
a familiar area of study for those explicitly adopting a transnational law lens in their work,
and well fits the practice-informed, problem-addressing, public/private divide jumping
context set out by Jessup as transnational law’s domain. Transnational environmental law
scholars eager to capture the influence of these legal rules on environmental problems,
though, remain stymied by the limits on access to information from and about arbitral
processes.
Many scholarly works on arbitration treat transparency as a normative issue, 52 rather than
focusing descriptively on what information is available, and what remains off-limits to
the public and interested researchers. Scholars thus argue that while “arbitral decisionmaking of yesteryear occurred in a virtual black box” … “[t]oday the situation is quite
different.” 53 This comment seems to include both international commercial arbitration
and investor-state arbitration in its scope while the transparency issues at stake in each
form of arbitration differ. 54 The cited improvements in the transparency of arbitral
processes most often relate to reforms making “the rules that regulate decision-making”
more readily available to interested parties, and to the growing number of voluntary and
involuntary disclosures. 55 While these reforms may go some way to disclosing
information on challenges to arbitrators and creating clearer guidance on arbitrator
standards of conduct, they do little to increase the disclosure to interested scholars of what
disputes are reaching arbitration.
At the same time as scholars are reporting that more arbitral awards are being voluntarily
published, 56 it is impossible to know what “tip of the iceberg” these awards represent.
This scholarship traces back to the detailed case for the publication of arbitration awards made in
J.D.M. Lew, The Case for the Publication of Arbitration Awards, in: J.C. Schultz & J. van den Berg
(eds.), THE ART OF ARBITRATION (Springer, 1982), 22–42; and T.E. Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral
Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23:3 COLUMBIA
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 579–614 (1985).
53
C.A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration 54 UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAW
REVIEW 1301–1338, 1312–1313 (2006).
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Rogers usefully canvasses the multiple possible means of transparency. Id.
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See D.M. Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration: The Need for
Procedural and Structural Reform, 41:3 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 923–964, 959
(2003) (“Today, several arbitral institutions, as well as independent publishers, have started to regularly
publish arbitral awards.”)
52

Ginsburg notes that the subset of awards that are published represents “an explicitly
biased sample” as the International Chamber of Commerce, for example, seeks to publish
“particularly interesting or unusual awards.” 57 But for non-experts it may be the
“uninteresting” and “usual” awards that equally illuminate. It is easy to calculate that
there is a large disparity between the sparse number of published awards and the
documented caseload of arbitral institutions which shows thousands of arbitrations taking
place each year. 58
For environmental law research, this offers many dead ends. While the attractiveness of
arbitration as a venue for resolving environmental disputes is widely advertised, 59 it is
challenging to discover how often arbitration clauses are used, how many environmental
disputes (or commercial disputes that include environmental issues) ever reach an arbitral
panel, and if so with what results. This limits an awareness of how partial, or how
representative, discussions of arbitral practices are when they draw on a small sample of
reported cases. Further, as still little is known about the composition of the “invisible
college” of arbitrators, 60 the extent to which arbitrators possess, or are open to, specialized
environmental and scientific knowledge remains unknown.
An added challenge emerges from the patterns of redaction common to arbitral reporting
that complicate searching environmental content, reducing carbon trading to “services”
and environmental goods to “products”. In practice, the much-applauded reforms to
disclosure that are in the interests of parties and voluntarily introduced might not be the
same sort of reforms needed to produce more informed and robust knowledge. Interviewbased studies help elucidate hidden aspects of arbitral practice, yet they run into some of
the same problems of “trust me” default visions of expertise described above. The
challenge then is not simply that knowledge about arbitration remains out of reach, but
that it is difficult to know how little one knows.
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II. Tracing Transplants
Scholars alert to transnational environmental law’s movements are increasingly attentive
to the movement of environmental law ideas, models, and forms across borders. 61
Discourses of diffusion, emphasizing and assuming environmental law’s transferability,
have become central to the way in which new environmental law ideas and approaches
are developed and communicated. 62 Yet the tasks of tracing the movement of law and its
underlying ideas are impeded by the many forces which obscure the processes by which
transnational influences shape both the substance of legislative “transplants” and
legislative drafting processes.
For example, a 2017 Climate Legislation Study calculated that more than 1,200 laws to
curb climate change have now been passed, an increase from about 60 laws in place two
decades ago. 63 Econometric research drawing on this dataset of legislation points to the
practice of international policy diffusion whereby the climate action a country undertakes
is likely to depend on prior climate legislation by other countries. 64 While these assertions
are made and justified by regressing climate legislation against the number of laws passed
in all other countries in the sample, little analysis is made of the pressures shaping
legislative form and content. 65 Such studies make valuable contributions to an
understanding of the proliferation of climate laws, but they also point to the underlying
methodological challenges implicit in trying to provide a comprehensive “global” image
of legislative activity, as well as a dynamic image of how law moves from place to place,
and why. Moreover, they reveal how hard it is to come up with a satisfactory definition
of what counts as climate legislation.
Attempts to trace diffusion of environmental law models contribute to understandings of
global power dynamics, and national influence. The EU’s claimed position of climate
leadership can thus be partially traced to its creation of models capable of transplantation
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(2019); J. B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of
Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY LQ 1295–1372 (2001).
62
For example, Peel and Osofsky contemplate existing rights-based judgments as offering a ‘model or
inspiration’ for climate litigation decisions in other jurisdictions. J. Peel & H. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in
Climate Litigation 7:1 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 37–67, 37 (2018).
63
M. Nachmany, S. Fankhauser, J. Setzer & A. Averchenkova, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment,
2017), 4.
64
S. Fankhauser, C. Gennaioli, & M. Collins, Do International Factors Influence the Passage of Climate
Change Legislation? 16:3 CLIMATE POLICY 318–331 (2016).
65
A. Boute, The Impossible Transplant of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Challenge of Energy
Market Regulation, 6:1 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59–85 (2017) [Boute].
61

elsewhere. 66 The EU’s Emission Trading Scheme has served as a model for many
countries looking to introduce the legal infrastructure necessary for domestic carbon
markets. But it is a model that is proving challenging to export. 67 In other areas of
transnational environmental law, accounts of “borrowing” European law models for
environmental legislation are equally easy to find, 68 but largely unsystematic, and often
reveal examples rather than “thick description” of how these models were tailored for
local needs. Rarely on offer is a view of how such one might adjust or fine-tune these
universal or borrowed prescriptions to particular local contexts. 69 This gap reveals the
larger challenge for environmental law research emerging from limited qualitative and
quantitative data on the environmental law practices of non-OECD countries. 70
These issues go further to the point that legislative drafting processes generally operate
in a context of limited transparency and under a veil of secrecy. In many countries, the
confidentiality of legislative drafting materials is protected through statutes. 71 This
prevents a full understanding of the significance of transnational influences on the
domestic enactment of environmental legislation. The reality of such transnational
influence must instead be gleaned from reports of the practice of drafting including either
voluntary or mandatory consideration of international “best practices”, 72 reliance on
K. Kulovesi, Climate Change in the EU External Relations: Please Follow my Example (or I Might
Force You to), in: E. Morgera (ed.), THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
EU AND INTERNATIONAL LAW DIMENSIONS (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 115–148.
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foreign legislative drafting consultants, 73 the sponsorship of drafting initiatives by
international financial institutions and international organizations, 74 “study tours” of
other countries to inform climate legislation, 75 job advertisements for international
consultancy work on legislative drafting, 76 and the curricula of international legislative
drafting conferences 77 and graduate training programs 78. Yet these sources still afford
only a partial glimpse of such practices.
Authors who “divulge” transnational influences and processes shaping their own
legislative drafting experiences do so in the spirit of describing their work rather than
through formalized research studies. The very few empirical studies of legislative drafting
processes, such as Gluck and Bressman’s interview-based analysis of US Congressional
practices, only confirms the methodological difficulties with gaining access to the
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relevant people to pierce a deep culture of confidentiality surrounding legislative
drafting. 79
III. Judges and “the Project” of Environmental Law
Interest in how legal norms travel has attempted to incorporate the insight that judges also
travel and their travel involves “messy and diverse” processes of judicial interaction. 80
Judges clearly occupy a privileged place in legal analysis, yet thinking about judges as
research subjects exposes still more black boxes. A wide view of transnational lawmaking invites questions about judicial practices well beyond written court decisions.
These questions transcend current interest in “what judges do” that tends to center around
issues of judicial “independence”, framing “extra-judicial” activities as transgressions.81
They move analysis beyond the more easily traceable practices of explicit transjudicial
borrowing reflected in the use of foreign law materials in domestic courts.
Appreciating the multi-faceted dimensions of the professional lives of judges brings into
view different dimensions of judicial work including speaking, writing, and advocacy,
some of which will be directly related to the judicial function (for example, advocating
for specialized tribunals and the form they should take), some not. Scholars are adopting
diverse strategies for attempting to access the “black box” of judicial lives outside of their
courtrooms. Kendall and Sorkin traced financial disclosures to track the sponsors and
funders of private judicial conferences which “represent a veiled attempt to lobby the
judiciary under the guise of judicial education”. 82 A report on the feasibility and structure
of a specialized environmental court for England and Wales revealed the involvement of
a range of judges from other jurisdictions. 83 Environmental law perhaps offers a
particularly vivid exposure to the “project” of environmental protection motivating a
select group of judges who have taken on openly public advocacy roles speaking in
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conferences, publishing scholarship as well as writing judicial opinions to advance
particular environmental law reforms and projects. 84
Little is, however, systematically known about environmental law judges’ efforts to
inﬂuence law and policy as opinion leaders, network builders, publicists and law reform
advocates --efforts referred to as off-bench judicial mobilization 85 -- or about judicial
practices of off-bench resistance. 86 A strong sense of the common ‘project’ of
environmental protection being advanced through the judiciary can be gleaned from
articles like Lord Carnwath’s “world tour” 87 of exceptional environmental law judges and
his celebration of the crucial role that “judges for the environment” have to play, both
individually and collectively. 88 It is equally evident from the work and choice of issue
focus of judicial networks such as the ASEAN Chief Justices’ Roundtable on the
Environment. 89
Biographies and autobiographies offer additional and valuable glimpses of the people
who animate the projects of transnational environmental law. Judge Jessup’s refusal to
clinically separate public and private international law is rendered more palpable from an
understanding of his prior legal practice that included work as a legal advisor to the
governments of foreign states at the same time as representing a private nongovernmental organization. 90 While still rare, examples of ‘life writing’ by and about
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judges, as well as about international law scholars and practitioners, provide one route
into this particular black box of transnational law practice. 91
IV. The Private Lives of Contractual Texts
A final disparity I draw attention to here is that which exists between growing scholarly
interest in exploring the significance of global value chains as aspects of environmental
governance, and the still limited knowledge base of contracting upon which this research
is based. Environmental law is heavily implicated in global value chains and multiple and
intersecting sources of law surround and engage with supply chain contracts. 92 Yet a full
scholarly view of how these legal obligations move across time and space through
contractual practices is hampered by the challenge of accessing private contractual
texts. 93 This is not a problem of shallow or unambitious scholarly efforts. It is a problem
of the limited access to “private” sources of transnational law.
In a variety of fields scholars see great potential in contracts as accountability
mechanisms for private actors operating in international legal spaces. 94 Yet scholarship
and commentary on global value chains may emerge from a limited view of the actual
content of these contracts. Scholars attempt to find a variety of ways around the problem
of the “black box” of contractual texts. They may base their analysis on existing
knowledge of global value chains, rather than the contracts which comprise those
chains. 95 They may analyze contracting practices from standard form contracts that are
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publicly available on corporate websites. 96 Or they may ground their analysis in
interviews of supply chain participants rather than textual review of the contracts
themselves. 97 Scholars also may secure access to a select handful of contractual
examples, 98 or offer a deep analysis based on a single example, 99 or rely on codes of
conduct as a proxy for examining contracts. 100 This work is enriched by explicit
acknowledgment of “the dense veil of confidentiality that often accompanies
outsourcing” and the significant selection biases that prevent scholarship from being
generalizable to the broader population of outsourcing deals. 101
Further heroic attempts to provide a fuller view of contracting practices, and texts, emerge
from the efforts of scholars to use their access as in-house counsel to comment on
contractual forms 102 and from NGOs campaigning for greater transparency and
contractual disclosure in natural resource project settings. 103 In some situations, the
selective visibility of contracts might be mitigated by access to other sources such as the
data emerging from interviews of managerial motivations to adopt CSR measures, 104 and
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from ethnographic accounts of corporate cultures. 105 But the generalizability of these
“partial views” is questionable. The extent of the practical problem of access to private
contracts is highlighted in contexts such as that of cobalt mining in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo where corporations allege that contractual measures guarantee
their compliance with human rights standards yet watchdogs are unable to access these
contracts or measure their implementation. 106
Knowledge of individual, localized contracts can also obscure another reality that only
meta-analysis might unveil, the extent to which seemingly customized deals incorporate
pressure for standardization, resulting in the use of standard templates rather than highly
unique contractual terms. 107 Thus, the documentary lens of the deal can “prevent people
from realizing that deals are not as unique and creative as advertised.” 108 Deal documents
that might appear as “the embodiment of choices” in another light might be seen as
composed almost entirely of recycled and recyclable parts. 109
The “black boxes” I discuss here were not ones that likely troubled Jessup. He had his
own. By acknowledging that “secret archives” do exist, and that there is a “larger
storehouse of rules” worth accessing, Jessup issued an open invitation to continue to think
about what legal knowledge is not satisfactorily captured in existing understandings of
private and public international law. Accessing knowledge about law and about legal
knowledge that operates in any kind of global space is far from straight-forward. It points
to the complexity of the task facing not only lawyers and legal scholars, but many others
who are “beginning to ask how precisely can any idea be understood ‘in context’ if
context is now defined to encompass intercontinental communications, multilingual
communities, or the expansion of world systems”. 110
E. CONCLUSION: FROM SEEN/UNSEEN TO KNOWN/UNKNOWABLE
As this collection of essays celebrating the 60th anniversary of Jessup’s Storrs Lecture
reveals, transnational law scholarship is full of exciting and far-reaching initiatives to
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make visible aspects of law-making that narrowly targeted engagements with state-based
law might miss. This chapter’s perhaps overly sober comments on methodology are not
designed to take away from the larger celebration of the depth and breadth of new
knowledge of transnational processes, and of law, that has emerged, inspired by Jessup’s
own writing.
Two particular dimensions of transnational law serve as the focal points for this chapter.
The first is transnational law’s preoccupation with visibility, a concern that permeates
attempts to transcend narrow conceptions of law, law’s sources, and its relevant actors.
The second is the privileged place that transnational law reserves for practice. On both
fronts, there is an opportunity for scholars to be much more forthcoming in articulating
how a transnational law approach might illuminate new visions of law, and in so doing,
how it might employ practice. I would suggest that there is much low-hanging fruit here.
The methodological bases for many practice-based insights are easily known. They are
just rarely written down. The solution may be sometimes as simple as overcoming a
reluctance to situate ourselves and our professional lives in our texts.
It is less obvious how to overcome the challenges of selective vision and partial
knowledge. Indeed, this chapter’s foray into some of the “black boxes” that complicate
efforts to understand transnational environmental law-making reveals that, despite best
efforts, some knowledge of law and legal processes remains off-limits. But scholars are
finding new and creative ways to access sources and gain forbidden knowledge, as this
chapter suggests. They are successfully breaking into transnational law’s “black boxes”.
To conclude, as did Jessup sixty years ago, there is still work for the “headlong scholar”
to go where the “foreign offices, the legislatures, and the courts” fear to tread. 111
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